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In January 2012, IPPR published The dog that finally barked: England as an emerging 
political community.1 In it we argued that an emerging English political identity may over 
time come to challenge the institutions and practices of the UK more profoundly than 
anything happening in the so-called Celtic fringe, even Scottish independence.
Here we return to Englishness and its political implications, analysing findings from a 
further survey – the Future of England survey 2012 (for details, see the appendix to this 
report). There are at least three reasons why this is appropriate. 
First, several of the key arguments presented in The dog that finally barked focused on 
changing attitudes. We argued that:
• People in England increasingly stress the English aspects of their Anglo-British 
identity.
• They are increasingly dissatisfied with Scotland’s apparently privileged position within 
the UK.
• They are increasingly supportive of the idea that England should receive proper 
recognition within the governing structures of the UK but have not reached a 
consensus as to how this should be done.
• English identity is becoming increasingly politicised – the more strongly our survey 
respondents stressed an English identity, the more they tended to favour some form 
of explicit recognition of England within the UK.
Our new survey provides an opportunity to determine whether these conclusions – many 
new, some controversial – are still supported by subsequent data.
Second, our new survey allows us to explore the impact on public attitudes of external 
developments since the first Future of England survey was conducted in September 2011. 
In the UK, summer 2012 saw Britishness well and truly to the fore during both the Queen’s 
diamond jubilee celebrations and the London Olympic and Paralympic Games. Although 
given active support by the Olympic authorities, demonstrations of British sentiment were 
also spontaneous and – particularly, it appeared, within the English heartland of the UK – 
widely popular. Perhaps this efflorescence of Britishness has rekindled affection for Britain 
among the people of England, reversing the tendency to stress the English dimension 
of their identity and casting doubt on our previous conclusions. But if English identity is 
sufficiently robust as to withstand such widespread promotion of Britishness then this 
would add further credence to our original analysis.
Third, the follow-up research reported here allows us to explore in more detail two 
compelling and politically crucial themes. The first is Europe. Although not a central focus 
of the 2011 survey, that study provided some evidence that – compared to both the rest 
of the British Isles and Europe more generally – the English are particularly conscious 
of and hostile towards the EU. That finding in turn raises the question of how attitudes 
towards Europe relate to an increasingly strong English identity and to the growing 
dissatisfaction with the UK’s territorial status quo highlighted by the 2011 survey. Put 
more simply, are attitudes towards England’s two unions – the United Kingdom and the 
European Union – related to each other? The 2012 survey allows us to explore this in 
more detail.
1	 Richard	Wyn	Jones,	Guy	Lodge,	Ailsa	Henderson	and	Daniel	Wincott	(2012)	The dog that finally barked: 
England as an emerging political community,	London:	IPPR.	http://www.ippr.org/publication/55/8542/the-dog-
that-finally-barked-england-as-an-emerging-political-community	
	 	 IntroduCtIon:	the	dog	that	barked
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The second key issue is the relationship of ethnic minorities in England to English 
national identity. As noted in The dog that finally barked, in stark contrast to the position 
in Scotland and Wales (where ethnic minorities seem to find the ‘local’ national identity 
more amenable than Britishness), in England ethnic minorities tend to cleave towards 
Britishness. Given that Englishness seems in the ascendency among the population as 
a whole, this raises potentially troubling questions about social and political cohesion. 
But there were relatively few ethnic minority respondents in the 2011 survey, so any 
conclusions were highly tentative. Our 2012 survey was designed to allow us to explore 
ethnic minority attitudes in much greater depth.
The remainder of this report is divided into four chapters:
• England as an emerging political community: Here we reconsider the key 
findings of the 2011 Future of England survey in the wake of the events of 2012. 
Has a ‘more British’ sense of national identity been revitalised? Has the increasing 
tendency in England to view the territorial status quo as unsatisfactory continued or 
been reversed? And, crucially, what is the latest evidence concerning the increasing 
politicisation of English national identity? Does English national identity continue to 
be related to the view that England should be given greater recognition in the UK’s 
constitutional arrangements?
• England’s two unions: Here we explore the relationship between attitudes towards 
the two political unions of which England is a part. To what extent are attitudes 
towards the UK and the EU related?
• Can Englishness be inclusive? This chapter focuses on patterns of national identity 
within the ethnic minority population in England, as well as on their attitudes towards 
questions of territorial governance.
• Conclusion: The partisan politics of Englishness: This final chapter explores 
the differing attitudes of political party supporters towards England’s two unions, 
illustrating the particular challenges that face party leaders in responding to English 
discontent.
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In The dog that finally barked (Wyn Jones et al 2012, see note 1), we advanced three 
central arguments:
• That people in England were increasingly stressing the English dimension of what was 
still, overwhelmingly, a joint Anglo-British identity.
• That people in England were increasingly dissatisfied with the way that England is 
governed within the United Kingdom, and increasingly inclined to support some 
explicit institutional recognition of England.
• That English national identity appeared increasingly politicised: the stronger someone’s 
sense of English identity, the greater tended to be their dissatisfaction with the UK 
and how it dealt with England.
These findings underpinned the core claim of the report: that England was a (re)emerging 
political community. Here we revisit these findings from the 2011 Future of England survey 
(FoEs) in the wake of the events of 2012.
1.1	Patterns	of	national	identity	in	England	and	the	UK
Our survey includes two direct measures of national identity in England. The simplest, 
and crudest, is the ‘forced choice’ question (shown in figures 1.1 and 1.2). This is a 
two-stage question: respondents are first asked to choose which identities (from a range 
of options) they would apply to themselves, with respondents able to pick as many or 
as few as they wish; then they are required to select one option that ‘best describes the 
way you think of yourself’.
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Question:	Which,	if	any,	of	the	words	below	best	describe	the	way	you	think	of	yourself?	(Please	tick	as	many	or	as	few	as	
apply)	
Note:	Answers	other	than	English	or	British	not	shown.	
	 1.	 england	aS	an	emergIng	polItICal	
CommunIty
Figure 1.1 
‘Forced choice’ national 
identity (stage one), 
England, 1996–2012 (%)
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Question:	And	if	you	had	to	choose,	which	one	BEST	describes	the	way	you	think	of	yourself?	
Notes:	Answers	others	than	‘British’	or	‘English’	not	shown.	It	is	perhaps	worth	noting	that	the	2006	data	was	collected	
around	the	time	of	the	football	world	cup.
As in 2011, at the first stage most 2012 survey respondents identified 
themselves as both English and British. However, more identified themselves 
as English (60 per cent) than British (58 per cent). And although the difference 
between these two groups reduced from 6 per cent in 2011 to 2 per cent, the 
level of British identity recorded was the lowest in any survey reported here 
(going back to 1996).
At the second, ‘forced choice’ stage, more respondents chose to describe 
themselves as British (49 per cent) than English (41 per cent). This is the reverse 
of what we found in 2011, when 42 per cent chose British and 49 per cent 
English, suggesting a modest strengthening of British national identity from 
2011 to 2012.
In the UK, where, as a multinational state, many people have overlapping or 
nested national identities, the ‘Moreno question’ is better suited to charting the 
strength of identity. It asks respondents to locate themselves on a spectrum 
of options extending from exclusively English to exclusively British (as seen in 
figure 1.3).
Compared to the 2011 FoEs, our 2012 data shows some weakening at the 
exclusively English end of the spectrum, and modest growth in the plural 
‘equally English and British’ category. Yet these changes are limited, and it 
remains the case that twice as many prioritise English identity (35 per cent) 
as British (17 per cent). Only 10 per cent of respondents claim to be ‘more 
British than English’. In this sense there was no discernible post-Olympics 
‘Britishness bounce’.
Figure 1.2 
‘Forced choice’ national 
identity (stage two), 
England, 1992–2012 (%)
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Question:	Which,	if	any,	of	the	following	best	describes	the	way	you	think	of	yourself?
Moreover, if we consider the longer timeframe offered by the British Social Attitudes (BSA) 
data, it is clear that while there is some fluctuation from one year to the next, English 
identity has strengthened since the late 1990s (see figures 1.1–1.3). Although most 
people retain an overlapping English and British identity, what has emerged – as we argue 
in our previous report – is ‘a different kind of Anglo-British identity in which the “Anglo” 
component is increasingly considered the primary source of identity for the English’ 
(Wyn Jones et al 2012: 20). What’s more, this trend has not gone unnoticed within 
England: when asked, 58 per cent agree that the English have ‘become more aware of 
English national identity in recent years’ (FoEs 2012).
Further evidence of the strength of English national sentiment is provided by the most 
inclusive survey of them all, the census. For the first time, the 2011 census explored 
patterns of national identity across the UK by means of a question similar to the first part 
of the ‘forced choice’ question discussed above. 
In England, fully 70 per cent of the population identified themselves either as solely English 
(60 per cent) or English in combination with some other national identity (10 per cent). In 
another finding that is in line with the 2011 FoEs, the census found only limited regional 
variation across England – with one significant exception – in the strength of English 
national identification (see table 1.1). That exception was London. In the dual capital of 
England and the United Kingdom, while English national identity remains the most popular 
choice, Englishness was notably weaker than elsewhere and Britishness rather stronger. 
Figure 1.3 
Trends in Moreno 
national identity, 
England, 1997–2012 (%)
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Indeed, a majority did not feel any sense of English national identity at all (though even 
greater numbers in the capital felt no sense of British identity either).
Respondent selected… Did not select…
English only British only
British + other 
(British  
+ English only) English British
North East 70 15 11 (11) 20 74
North West 66 17 11 (10) 24 73
Yorkshire and 
the Humber
66 17 11 (10) 24 72
East Midlands 66 17 10 (9) 25 73
West Midlands 63 19 10 (9) 28 71
East 65 16 10 (9) 25 74
London 37 31 7 (5) 56 62
South East 62 18 11 (10) 28 71
South West 65 16 11 (10) 24 73
England 60 19 10 (9) 30 71
Source:	2011	Census
What is particularly striking about the census data is the weakness of British national 
identity in England. Table 1.2 shows that only 29 per cent of census participants 
identified themselves as feeling any sense of British national identity. Indeed, when the 
relevant Scottish census data is published later in 2013, it is overwhelmingly likely that, 
of the constituent national units of the UK, only in Northern Ireland – that is, outside 
Great Britain – did even a plurality of census respondents feel any sense of British 
national identity. Although the census was taken before the Jubilee and the Olympics in 
2012, the clarity of its findings on the strength of Britishness runs starkly contrary to the 
narrative of revivalism that we saw throughout last year.
England Wales
Northern 
Ireland
E/S/W/NI only 60 58 21
E/S/W/NI + other 70 66 29
British only 19 17 40
British + other 29 26 48
Irish only 1 0 25
Irish + other 0 0 28
Source:	2011	Census	
Note:	Equivalent	data	for	Scotland	was	not	available	at	time	of	publication.
Nonetheless, it would be misleading to suggest that the relationship between English 
and British national identities in England is (so far, at least) exactly analogous to the 
relationship between British national identity and Scottish and Welsh national identities 
in those nations.2 Table 1.3 shows responses to a question in FoEs 2012 asking 
respondents which nation they would prefer to have inscribed on their passports 
(compared with equivalent 2011 data from Wales). That fully 40 per cent of people 
2	 A	striking	feature	of	the	Welsh	data	is	that	fully	11.2	per	cent	of	the	population	of	Wales	subscribe	to	an	English	
only	national	identity,	with	a	further	1.5	per	cent	describing	themselves	as	English	and	British	only.	(English	
in	any	form	accounts	for	13.8	per	cent	of	the	population.)	Given	that	21	per	cent	of	the	Welsh	population	was	
born	in	England	–	with	much	higher	concentrations	in	certain	areas	–	the	growth	and	politicisation	of	English	
identity	has	potentially	significant	ramifications	west	of	Offa’s	Dyke.
Table 1.1 
Regional differentiation 
in national identification, 
England, 2011 (%)
Table 1.2 
National identities across 
the UK, 2011 (%)
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in England would, if given the opportunity, choose an English passport is striking, 
especially given the complete absence of any public debate around English citizenship. 
Nonetheless, even if England is emerging as a political community, Britishness remains 
a more important reference point for political identity for the people of England than for 
their neighbours in Scotland or Wales. This should, of course, come as little surprise 
given that debates about the notion of Scottish and Welsh citizenship are of long 
standing – be that explicitly through those nations’ respective nationalist parties, or 
implicitly through the actions of devolved government.
England Wales
British 51 38
English 40 8
European 3 2
Welsh 1 50
Irish 1 <1
Scottish 1 <1
Other 2 3
Source:	Future	of	England	2012,	Welsh	Referendum	Study	2011;	no	data	available	for	Scotland	
Question:	If	you	were	allowed	to	choose	the	nationality	that	appears	on	your	passport,	which	of	these	descriptions	would	
you	choose?	
Note:	Equivalent	data	for	Scotland	was	not	available	at	time	of	publication.
Is the rise of English sentiment confined to particular social and demographic groups? 
Table 1.4 breaks down responses to the Moreno question by different groups and shows 
that across all age-groups, social classes and both genders Englishness is stronger 
than Britishness. The one important exception concerns members of England’s ethnic 
minorities (discussed further in chapter 3). This is not to say that English sentiment is 
experienced uniformly across England’s diverse population: Englishness is stronger 
among the older sections of the population than it is with 18–24-year-olds, and stronger 
among the less affluent social classes (C2s and DEs). Men prioritise their English identity 
more than women.
English > British 
Equally English 
and British British > English 
Difference 
between  
E>B and B>E N
All 35 39 17 +18 3,600
White British 36 39 16 +20 3,401
Non-white British 12 26 44 -32 651
18–24 31 36 24 +7 437
25–39 30 39 19 +11 924
40–59 39 39 15 +24 1,221
60+ 39 41 14 +25 1,018
Male 40 35 17 +23 1,756
Female 31 43 16 +15 1,844
AB 31 40 19 +12 1,005
C1 33 40 17 +16 1,076
C2 42 36 15 +27 753
DE 38 39 15 +23 753
Source:	Future	of	England	2012	
Note:	‘English	>	British’	combines	the	‘English	only’	and	‘More	English	than	British’	categories;	‘British	>	English’	combines	
‘British	only’	and	‘More	British	than	English’.
Table 1.3 
Preferred passport by 
GB nation, 2011/12 (%)
Table 1.4 
Moreno national 
identity by social 
group, 2012 (%)
IPPR  |  England and its two unions: The anatomy of a nation and its discontents9
In summary, there appears to have been a modest strengthening of British national 
sentiment between 2011 and 2012. This may have been in response to the events 
of summer 2012, but we cannot definitively attribute cause and effect with our data, 
any more than we can predict whether such strengthening will persist. Nonetheless, 
both our 2011 and 2012 surveys demonstrate the strength of English identity, a point 
strongly reinforced by the 2011 census. Indeed, if the soon-to-be-published Scottish 
census data is consistent with expectations then the UK will be revealed as a state in 
which British national identity is not the main national identity in any of the three national 
territories of Great Britain.
1.2	Constitutional	preferences
Our 2012 survey offers no indication that any modest strengthening of British identity 
in England is matched by increased support for current governance arrangements 
in the UK. If anything, the opposite is true. Our 2011 survey revealed substantial 
dissatisfaction in England with how Scotland, in particular, is treated within the UK. 
Scotland was felt to receive more than its fair share of public spending (and England 
less than its fair share). Our 2012 survey suggests such attitudes hardening: as shown 
in figure 1.4, over half of respondents (52 per cent) felt that Scotland received more 
than its fair share of public spending.
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Question:	Would	you	say	that	compared	with	other	parts	of	the	UK,	Scotland	gets	pretty	much	its	fair	share	of	government	
spending,	more	than	its	fair	share,	or	less	than	its	fair	share?
Meanwhile, views on England’s fair share have remained stable, with the biggest group 
still convinced that England gets less than its fair share (see table 1.5). The strength of 
feeling in England is further illustrated by the fact that the number who say that Scotland 
gets more than its fair share of public spending has more than doubled in the last 
decade (from 24 per cent in 2002).
Figure 1.4 
English attitudes towards 
Scotland’s share 
of public spending, 
2000–2012 (%)
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2011 2012
More than fair 7 8
Pretty much fair 26 27
Less than fair 40 40
Don’t know 27 24
N 2,836 3,600
Source:	Future	of	England	survey	2011–12	
Question:	Would	you	say	that	compared	with	other	parts	of	the	UK,	England	gets	pretty	much	its	fair	share	of	government	
spending,	more	than	its	fair	share,	or	less	than	its	fair	share?
The English also overwhelmingly believe that public services delivered in Scotland should 
be funded by taxes levied in Scotland, and that Scottish MPs should not be allowed to 
vote on English laws. While changes to the wording of the question mean that data from 
our 2011 and 2012 surveys are not strictly comparable (but do enable direct comparison 
with the longer BSA time series), the 2012 findings are nonetheless striking. Over three-
quarters of respondents supported the proposition that the Scottish parliament should pay 
for the services it delivers out of taxes levied in Scotland (see table 1.6), while more than 
80 per cent agreed that Scottish MPs should not vote on English laws (table 1.7). Note 
also the intensity of feeling: 49 per cent and 55 per cent of English respondents ‘strongly 
agreed’ that, respectively, Scotland should pay its own way and that Scottish MPs should 
not be allowed to vote on English matters.
2001 2003 2007 2009 2011 2012
Strongly agree 20 22 28 36 44 49
Agree 53 52 47 46 36 29
Total agree 73 74 75 82 80 78
Neither agree nor disagree 12 12 14 10 * 11
Disagree 11 10 5 6 8 11
Strongly disagree 1 <1 1 <1 1 1
Total disagree 12 10 6 6 9 12
Source:	BSA	2001–09;	FoEs	2011–12	
Question:	To	what	extent	do	you	agree	or	disagree	with	the	following	statements?	(Please	tick	one	option	per	row)	‘Now	that	
Scotland	has	its	own	parliament,	it	should	pay	for	its	services	out	of	taxes	collected	in	Scotland’	
*	The	2011	FoEs	did	not	provide	a	‘neither/nor’	option.
2000 2001 2003 2007 2009 2011 2012
Strongly agree 18 19 22 25 31 53 55
Agree 45 38 38 36 35 26 26
Total agree 63 57 60 61 66 79 81
Neither / nor 19 18 18 17 17 * 8
Disagree 8 12 10 9 6 8 4
Strongly disagree 1 2 1 1 1 2 2
Total disagree 9 14 11 10 7 10 6
Source:	BSA	2000–09;	FoEs	2011–12	
Question:	To	what	extent	do	you	agree	or	disagree	with	the	following	statements?	(Please	tick	one	option	per	row)	‘Now	that	
Scotland	has	its	own	parliament,	Scottish	MPs	should	no	longer	be	allowed	to	vote	in	the	House	of	Commons	on	laws	that	
only	affect	England’	
*	The	2011	FoEs	did	not	provide	a	‘neither/nor’	option.
These findings could prove particularly significant should Scotland vote to remain in 
the United Kingdom in 2014. All the major unionist political parties are committed to 
strengthening the powers of the Scottish parliament over and above those set out in 
Table 1.5 
English attitudes towards 
England’s share of public 
spending, 2011/12 (%)
Table 1.6 
‘The Scottish parliament 
should pay for services 
out of taxes collected 
in Scotland’, England, 
2001–12 (%)
Table 1.7 
‘Scottish MPs should not 
vote on English laws’, 
England, 2000–12 (%)
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the Scotland Act 2012. In designing a model of ‘devo-more’ for Scotland, the unionist 
parties will surely need to reflect on the state of English public opinion presented here, if 
the model is to prove sufficiently versatile to work effectively. 
That our English respondents believe that Scotland benefits disproportionately from 
the union is further underlined in their responses to a question that probed perceptions 
of the economic benefits of being part of the UK. When asked whether the English or 
Scottish economy benefits most from being part of the UK, just under a half of English 
respondents (49 per cent) point to the Scottish economy. In contrast, only 23 per cent 
of English respondents say that the English and Scottish economies benefit equally from 
membership of the union.
Also striking is the lack of trust in the UK government to act in England’s interests (see 
table 1.8). As in the 2011 survey, around 60 per cent of respondents did not think that 
the UK government could be relied upon to do so, with 44 per cent trusting it ‘not very 
much’ and 18 per cent ‘not at all’.
2011 2012
A great deal 4 3
A fair amount 31 27
Not very much 42 44
Not at all 17 18
Don’t know 6 8
N 2,836 3,600
Source:	Future	of	England	survey	2011–12	
Question:	How	much	do	you	trust	the	UK	government	at	Westminster	to	work	in	the	best	long-term	interests	of	England?
Table 1.9 shows such sentiments are widespread across England. Although Londoners 
appear a little less dissatisfied than the English average, there is a striking regional 
uniformity in views. The overall message is clear: English dissatisfaction with the territorial 
status quo is both broad and deep.
ENG NE NW Y&H EM WM East LON SE SW
Scotland gets more 
than its fair share of 
spending
52 55 49 44 54 53 56 51 54 53
Scottish parliament 
should pay for services 
from own taxes
78 76 76 74 87 78 79 75 80 77
Scottish MPs should 
no longer be allowed to 
vote on English laws 
81 82 78 80 84 81 82 76 83 81
The UK government 
can’t be trusted to 
work in English interest
62 62 65 63 61 67 59 56 59 58
N 3,600 170 481 373 338 350 400 532 588 367
Following the publication of The dog that finally barked, one question regularly posed to us 
was how salient were the questions of territorial governance that we highlighted within it? 
After all, survey participants may express dissatisfaction when specifically probed on an issue 
without necessarily regarding it to be a high priority. Our 2012 survey attempted to assess this 
by asking respondents to prioritise those constitutional issues that they regard as requiring 
Table 1.8 
‘Do you trust the UK 
government to work 
in the best long-term 
interests of England?’ 
2011/12 (%)
Table 1.9 
English resentment by 
region, 2012 (% agree)
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‘urgent action or change at this time’.3 Unsurprisingly, perhaps, the UK’s relationship with 
Europe was accorded highest priority (table 1.10). But, strikingly, the question of ‘how England 
is governed now that Scotland has a parliament and Wales has an assembly’ was in a clear 
second place, well ahead of a range of other constitutional issues – including voting reform, 
reform of local government and the House of Lords, and even the position of Scotland within 
the UK – to which the political system itself has accorded much higher priority in recent years.
The UK’s relationship with the EU 59
How England is governed now that Scotland 
has a parliament and Wales has an assembly
42
A more proportional system for electing MPs 
at Westminster
29
Strengthening local government 27
Reforming the House of Lords 26
Scotland’s future relationship with the UK 25
The future of Northern Ireland 5
None of these 4
Don’t know 11
N 3,600
Source:	Future	of	England	survey	2012	
Question:	Which	three,	if	any,	of	the	following	areas	do	you	think	require	urgent	action	or	change	at	this	time?	(Please	select	
up	to	three	options)
A number of possible solutions could be taken to meet this need for ‘urgent action’ on 
how England is governed. One would be Scotland’s independence. However, 49 per cent 
of our respondents opposed this and 30 per cent were in favour.4
Yes
No
Don’t know
30%
49%
21%
Source:	Future	of	England	survey	2012;	N	=	3,600	
Question:	There	will	be	a	referendum	in	Scotland	in	2014	on	Scottish	independence.	Do	you	agree	that	Scotland	should	
become	an	independent	country?
3	 We	acknowledge	that	constitutional	issues	themselves	are	not	considered	a	high	priority	by	the	public.	
4	 These	are	very	close	to	the	levels	of	support	for	union	and	independence	revealed	in	Scottish	opinion	polls	
conducted	around	the	time	of	the	FoEs	survey.
Table 1.10 
Priorities for ‘urgent 
action or change’, 
England, 2012 (%)
Figure 1.5 
‘Scotland should 
become an 
independent country’, 
England, 2012 (%)
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Equally, English independence might be seen as a potential response to the electorate’s 
call for action. We broached this possibility for the first time in our 2012 survey 
and garnered an intriguing response. Despite no significant political party or actor 
advocating this option, those supporting the proposition that ‘England should become 
an independent country’ (34 per cent) were only narrowly outnumbered by those in 
opposition (38 per cent). And when asked how they would respond if Scotland were to 
vote to become independent, a plurality (39 per cent, compared with 33 per cent who 
disagreed) then said that England too should become independent.
‘England should become an 
independent country’
‘If Scotland votes to become 
independent then England should 
become an independent country’
Strongly agree 17 18
Tend to agree 17 21
All agree 34 39
Neither agree nor disagree 18 17
Tend to disagree 19 16
Strongly disagree 19 15
All disagree 38 31
Don’t know 9 12
N 1,826 1,826
Source:	Future	of	England	survey	2012	
Questions:	To	what	extent	do	you	agree	or	disagree	with	the	following	statement?	England	should	become	an	independent	
country;	If	Scotland	votes	to	become	an	independent	country,	to	what	extent	do	you	agree	or	disagree	with	the	following	
statement?	England	should	become	an	independent	country
Putting to one side the (currently unlikely) possibility of English independence, our 2012 
survey included several questions designed to probe respondents’ views on how England 
should be governed.5 Responses to these questions confirm:
• low and decreasing support for the status quo
• very low support for English regionalism
• strong support for a form of governance that treats England as a distinct political unit
• continuing lack of consensus about which English option is appropriate.
As shown in table 1.12, barely one-fifth of the electorate supports the territorial status quo. 
Support for English regionalism is lower still. By contrast, the two ‘English options’ taken 
together – English votes on English laws and an English parliament – are supported by a major-
ity of respondents, with more tending to the former than the latter (36 per cent to 20 per cent).
2011 2012
For England to be governed as it is now with laws made by all MPs in the UK parliament 24 21
For England to be governed with laws made by English MPs in the UK parliament* 34 36
For each region in England to have its own elected assembly 9 8
For England as a whole to have its own new English parliament with law-making powers 20 20
Don’t know 14 16
N 2,836 1,774
Source:	Future	of	England	survey	2011–12	
Question:	With	all	the	changes	going	on	in	the	way	different	parts	of	the	United	Kingdom	are	run,	which	of	the	following	do	
you	think	would	be	best	for	England?	
*	‘English	votes	on	English	laws’
5	 This	report	does	not	consider	the	case	of	localism	and	empowering	local	government	insofar	as	it	might	
provide	a	partial	solution	to	the	‘English	question’.	This	will	be	considered	in	more	detail	in	future	work.	
Table 1.11 
English attitudes to 
English independence 
2012 (%)
Table 1.12 
English preferences 
for the governance of 
England, 2011/12 (%)
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Figure 1.6 illustrates responses to another question, probing the same issues but in a 
slightly different manner. It confirms low support for the territorial status quo, at 22 per 
cent. And in combination the two ‘English options’ again garner majority support with, 
again, English votes on English laws winning the backing of the largest group. It also 
confirms that, even when considered alongside other options, there is some support for 
English independence.
At this point it may be tempting to conclude that our previous caution in arguing that 
views in England have not coalesced around a particular ‘English option’ is misplaced 
or outdated. Should ‘English votes for English laws’ now be considered the favoured 
alternative to the status quo? The evidence presented in figure 1.7 suggests not.	When 
respondents were asked to choose directly between English votes on English laws or 
an English parliament, they split their votes almost evenly – and both options were more 
popular than the status quo. Perhaps the clearest finding from these responses is that 
the status quo is not much of an option. Moreover, on a variety of question wordings, the 
status quo is consistently less favoured than alternatives which would give some form of 
institutional recognition to England as a whole.
Source:	Future	of	England	survey	2012;	N	=	1,774	
Question:	Thinking	about	how	England	should	be	
governed,	which	one	of	the	following	statements	comes	
closest	to	your	view?	
*	‘English	votes	on	English	laws’
Source:	Future	of	England	survey	2012;	N	=	1,826	
Question:	Thinking	about	possible	arrangements	for	
making	laws	for	England	two	options	are	often	mentioned.	
If	you	had	to	choose	which	one	would	you	prefer?	
*	‘English	votes	on	English	laws’
Figure 1.6 (left) 
English preferences for 
England’s constitution, 
2012 (%)
Figure 1.7 (right) 
English preferences for 
law-making in England, 
2012 (%)
England should be governed as it is now with 
laws made by all MPs in the UK parliament
England should be governed with laws made 
solely by English MPs in the UK parliament*
England should have its own new English 
parliament with law-making powers
England should be an independent state inside 
the EU
England should be an independent state outside 
the EU
Don’t know
22%
33%18%
7%
8%
12%
For England to be governed with laws made 
solely by English MPs in the UK parliament*
For England to have its own parliament with 
law-making powers
Keep things as they are at present
Don’t know
30%
29%
25%
16%
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1.3	The	politicisation	of	English	identity
The final and perhaps most significant claim highlighted in our previous report, The dog 
that finally barked, was that English national identity has become politicised. Specifically, 
our 2011 data suggested that the stronger a person’s sense of English identity, the more 
likely they were to be dissatisfied with the place of England within the post-devolution 
United Kingdom. Our 2012 survey data strongly confirms this conclusion.
Table 1.13 shows how national identity (as measured by the Moreno question – see figure 
1.3) interacts with discontentment with post-devolution governing arrangements. It is clear, 
even in the context of high levels of overall discontentment, that those who identify strongly 
as English are more dissatisfied with those governing arrangements than those who feel 
more British. And the relationship between identity and dissatisfaction was at least as 
marked in 2012 as in 2011: it is unassuaged by any post-2012 Jubilee/Olympics glow.
All
English not 
British
More English 
than British
Equally English 
and British
More British 
than English
British not 
English
2011 2012 2011 2012 2011 2012 2011 2012 2011 2012 2011 2012
Scotland gets more 
than its fair share of 
spending
45 51 52 64 57 62 39 50 43 46 38 41
Scottish parliament 
should pay for 
services from its 
own taxes (strongly 
agree)*
80 
(45)
81 
(49)
82 
(67)
85 
(76)
87 
(51)
90 
(58)
79 
(37)
82 
(45)
77 
(35)
78 
(43)
73 
(38)
64 
(33)
Scottish MPs 
should no longer 
be allowed to vote 
on English laws 
(strongly agree)*
80 
(53)
81 
(55)
91 
(71)
91 
(77)
85 
(65)
88 
(62)
80 
(47)
82 
(52)
75 
(41)
81 
(52)
71 
(44)
71 
(37)
The UK 
government can’t 
be trusted to work 
in English interest
60 62 71 72 56 62 61 60 54 55 61 62
Source:	Future	of	England	survey	2011–12	
Note:	N	for	all	questions	is	3,600	unless	noted	with	*	where	N	is	1,826.
Tables 1.14 and 1.15 (over) show how responses to two questions probing governance 
and constitutional preferences for England (previously reported in table 1.12 and figure 
1.6) differ according to national identity. Once again it is clear that the ‘English options’ 
find most favour among those with the strongest sense of English national identity. Indeed, 
in both tables the status quo is the most popular option only among those claiming an 
exclusively British national identity. And, in table 1.15, the status quo is the fourth most 
popular constitutional option among those who feel exclusively English, trailing not only 
English votes on English laws and an English parliament but even English independence 
outside the EU. 
In summary, although the 2012 FoEs data suggests that a modest strengthening of 
British identity may have taken place since 2011, people in England nonetheless retain 
a stronger sense of English identity than they possessed in the late 1990s. Strength of 
English identity is clearly associated both with dissatisfaction with the post-devolution 
settlement and with support for establishing distinct governing arrangements for England. 
Our analysis in The dog that finally barked – that the English have begun to form a political 
community seeking some form of self-government – is thus strongly supported by these 
findings from a subsequent survey.
Table 1.13 
English attitudes to 
questions of territorial 
governance by Moreno 
national identity, 2011/12 
(% agree)
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All
English not 
British
More English 
than British
Equally English 
and British
More British 
than English
British not 
English
2011 2012 2011 2012 2011 2012 2011 2012 2011 2012 2011 2012
Status quo 24 21 13 14 19 16 31 23 21 29 35 30
‘English votes on 
English laws’ 
34 36 39 38 44 45 34 34 21 36 20 18
English parliament 20 20 32 27 23 22 10 19 13 8 16 23
Regional 
assemblies
9 8 7 7 5 7 12 7 28 11 8 11
Don’t know 14 16 9 14 10 10 13 17 17 16 20 18
N 2,836 1,774 470 269 604 384 946 654 282 176 236 135
Source:	Future	of	England	survey	2011–12	
Question:	With	all	the	changes	going	on	in	the	way	different	parts	of	the	UK	are	run,	which	of	the	following	do	you	think	
would	be	best	for	England?	For	England	to	be	governed	as	it	is	now	with	laws	made	by	all	MPs	in	the	UK	parliament	
(status	quo);	with	laws	made	by	English	MPs	in	the	UK	parliament;	for	each	region	of	England	to	have	its	own	assembly;	for	
England	as	a	whole	to	have	its	own	new	English	parliament	with	law-making	powers.
All
English not 
British
More English 
than British
Equally English 
and British
More British 
than English
British not 
English
Status quo 22 10 17 25 37 29
‘English votes on 
English laws’
33 39 38 32 33 25
English parliament 18 25 25 16 7 16
England 
independent inside 
the EU
7 5 6 6 8 8
England 
independent 
outside the EU
8 13 7 8 7 7
Don’t know 12 9 7 13 8 15
N 1,774 300 387 670 167 112
Source:	Future	of	England	survey	2012	
Question:	Thinking	about	how	England	should	be	governed,	which	one	of	the	following	statements	comes	closest	to	
your	view?	England	should	be	governed	as	it	is	now	with	laws	made	by	all	MPs	in	the	UK	Parliament;	England	should	be	
governed	with	laws	made	solely	by	English	MPs	in	the	UK	Parliament;	England	should	have	its	own	new	English	Parliament	
with	law-making	powers;	England	should	be	an	independent	state	inside	the	European	Union;	England	should	be	an	
independent	state	outside	the	European	Union.
The next chapter of this report explores how attitudes to European integration also form a 
key component of this English political community.
Table 1.14 
English preferences 
for the governance of 
England by Moreno 
national identity, 
2011/12 (%)
Table 1.15 
English preferences for 
England’s constitution by 
Moreno national identity, 
2012 (%)
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This section is concerned with how English attitudes towards the European Union relate to 
attitudes towards England’s other union, the UK.
2.1	Euroscepticism
The EU is very unpopular in England. When asked whether they considered the UK’s 
membership of the EU to be a ‘good thing’ or not, 43 per cent of respondents held a 
negative view of membership, compared to 28 per cent with a positive view. 
And when asked how they would vote in a referendum on continuing UK membership of 
the EU (and holding such a referendum is favoured by 67 per cent of respondents) the 
verdict was even more decisive. Fully half would vote for the UK to withdraw, only one-
third to remain.
Source:	Future	of	England	survey	2012;	N	=	3,600 Source:	Future	of	England	survey	2012;	N	=	3,600
These figures throw prime minister David Cameron’s manoeuvring around a possible 
future referendum on EU membership into stark relief. His is an extraordinary double 
gamble. First, unless he can bring home a significantly altered relationship with the 
EU, the English might well vote to leave. Second, recent polling in Scotland suggests 
the Scots think rather differently about Europe, and these differences could impact 
significantly on the independence debate. 
For example, in February 2013, Ipsos-MORI found that 53 per cent of Scots would vote 
in a referendum to stay in the EU and 34 per cent to leave – almost a perfect inversion of 
the English views revealed in FoEs.6 Just as strikingly, a Panelbase survey for the Sunday 
Times in May 2013 found that 44 per cent of Scots would be ‘very’ or ‘quite’ likely to 
vote for Scottish independence ‘if the UK was looking likely to vote to withdraw from 
the EU’ and 44 per cent very or quite unlikely to vote for Scottish independence in the 
6	 See	http://www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/3131/Scots-want-EU-referendum-but-
would-vote-to-stay-in.aspx	
	 2.	 england’S	two	unIonS:	europe	and	the	uk
Figure 2.1 (left) 
English attitudes to EU 
membership 2012 (%)
Figure 2.2 (right) 
English intentions in an 
EU referendum, 2012 (%)
Good thing
Bad thing
Neither
Don’t know
28%
43%
21%
8%
I would vote for the UK to 
remain a member of the EU
I would vote for the UK to 
leave the EU
I would 
not vote
Don’t know
33%
50%
5%
12%
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same situation.7 Most polls have shown that about half of Scots intend to vote ‘no’ in 
the independence referendum next year compared with only a third or so who intend to 
vote ‘yes’. But Euroscepticism elsewhere in the UK could potentially narrow that gap if 
Scottish people feel they could be dragged out of the EU against their will. Ipsos-MORI’s 
polling reaffirms the point. Asked ‘regardless of how you intend to vote in the Scottish 
independence referendum’ whether or not ‘an independent Scotland should be a member 
of the European Union’ 61 per cent favoured membership (including 59 per cent of those 
who intended to vote ‘no’ to independence) and only 33 per cent favoured Scotland not 
being an EU member. English Euroscepticism may be as much of a challenge to the UK’s 
own union as is Alex Salmond.
Perhaps the most dramatic indicator of the depth of Euroscepticism among much of 
England’s population (and of how specific these attitudes are to England) comes in 
responses to a FoEs question about the relative influence of different levels of government. 
Respondents were asked which of three levels of government – local government, the 
UK government or the EU – they think ‘has most influence over the way England is run’. 
Almost one in three (see figure 2.3) nominated the EU – and of that group, fully 81 per 
cent indicated that they would support UK withdrawal in an EU referendum. 
Such perceptions of (harmful) European influence in England contrast significantly with 
those in all other places where similar questions have been asked. In 2009, the current 
research team undertook comparative research in 15 European regions and minority 
nations (not including England). It found that the three regions other than England with 
the highest proportions identifying the EU level as having the most influence were Brittany, 
Upper Austria and Galicia. In each case, only 9 per cent of respondents believed that the 
EU had most influence in their respective regions – in England, this figure was 31 per cent 
(Wyn Jones et al 2012: 16). England appears truly to be an outlier in its attitudes to Europe.
Local councils
UK government
European Union
Other
Don’t know
55%
31%
2%
8%
3%
Source:	Future	of	England	survey	2012;	N	=	3,599	
Question:	Which	of	the	following	do	you	think	currently	has	the	most	influence	over	the	way	England	is	run?
7	 See	www.panelbase.com/news/TheSundayTimesScottishPollTables190513.pdf	
Figure 2.3 
English perceptions of 
government influence, 
2012 (%)
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As we have already discussed, Englishness as a national identity has both strengthened over 
the last decade and become increasingly politicised. Yet conventional wisdom would set this 
tide against that of Euroscepticism, which has historically been strongly associated with the 
symbolism and rhetoric of Britishness. Traditionally it is the Union flag rather than the cross of 
St George that is waved by members of Ukip, the UK Independence party, which has grown 
dramatically in prominence as the standard-bearer of Euroscepticism in the UK.
Yet our data shows a strong, consistent and unambiguous link between Euroscepticism 
and English, rather than British, national identity. For example, when asked whether or not 
UK membership of the EU is a good or bad thing, negative views are much more prevalent 
towards the more English end of the identity spectrum (per the Moreno view of national 
identity – see figure 1.3). Conversely – and again counter to received wisdom – attitudes 
to European integration are notably more positive among those with a more British identity 
(see table 2.1). It is British identifiers who are the Europhile group in England.
All
English not 
British
More English 
than British
Equally English 
and British
More British 
than English
British not 
English
Good thing 28 14 24 29 39 45
Bad thing 43 64 53 40 31 28
Neither 21 17 18 24 26 20
Don’t know 8 5 5 8 4 7
N 3,600 545 734 1,405 371 234
Source:	Future	of	England	survey	2012
The association between English identity and Euroscepticism (and conversely between 
British identity and more positive attitudes to the EU) can be further illustrated by the 
relationship between national identity and voting intentions in an EU referendum (table 2.2). 
Support for leaving the EU is much higher at the English end of the identity spectrum; a 
plurality of those with a mainly or exclusively British identity support continuing membership.
All
English not 
British
More English 
than British
Equally English 
and British
More British 
than English
British not 
English
Remain 33 17 28 33 45 49
Leave 50 72 58 48 37 35
Wouldn’t vote 5 3 3 6 5 3
Don’t know 12 8 10 13 13 13
N 3,600 545 734 1,405 371 234
Source:	Future	of	England	survey	2012
In a similar vein, table 2.3 demonstrates that exclusively English identifiers are far more 
likely than others to perceive Europe as having greatest influence over how England is run. 
Once again, it is the English rather than the British who are most likely to perceive (and 
object to) high levels of European influence.
All
English not 
British
More English 
than British
Equally English 
and British
More British 
than English
British not 
English
Local authority 3 3 3 2 3 4
UK government 55 37 55 59 68 60
European Union 31 50 35 29 22 25
Other 2 2 2 1 2 4
Don’t Know 8 7 5 9 6 7
N 3,599 543 734 1,405 371 234
Source:	Future	of	England	survey	2012
Table 2.1 
Perceptions of UK’s 
membership of 
the EU by Moreno 
national identity, 
England, 2012 (%)
Table 2.2 
Voting intention in an 
EU referendum by 
Moreno National Identity, 
England, 2012 (%)
Table 2.3 
Perceptions of 
government influence by 
Moreno national identity, 
England, 2012 (%)
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2.2	Devo-anxiety
Having established Euroscepticism in England as something associated with English 
– and not British – identity, we now turn to explore the relationship of Euroscepticism 
to what we might term ‘devo-anxiety’ among the English. Tables 2.4–2.6 report the 
relationship between responses on key questions tapping into both phenomena. 
As the tables show, in each case, those who adopt the Eurosceptic position (regarding 
EU membership as a bad thing; indicating they would vote for UK withdrawal from the 
EU; and regarding the EU as having most influence over the way England is run) are also 
notably more dissatisfied with the constitutional status quo in the UK.
Even in the context of questions that reveal substantial discontent across the population 
as a whole – those concerning Scottish MPs voting on English laws and the absence 
of a clear relationship between tax and spending in Scotland – Eurosceptics are 
clearly those most likely to harbour such discontent. And they do so extraordinarily 
emphatically: at levels approaching unanimity of response which are very rarely seen in 
social surveys.
Attitude to Eu membership
All Good thing Bad thing Neither
Scotland gets more than its fair 
share of spending
52 48 62 46
Scottish parliament should pay 
for services from its own taxes 
(strongly agree)*
81 (49) 75 (34) 91 (66) 80 (46)
Scottish MPs should no longer 
be allowed to vote on English 
laws (strongly agree)*
81 (55) 76 (44) 91 (70) 82 (51)
The UK government can’t be 
trusted to work in English interest
62 57 71 59
Source:	Future	of	England	survey	2012	
Note:	Base	N	for	all	questions	is	3,600	unless	noted	with	*	where	N	is	1,826.
Voting intention in an Eu referendum
All Remain Leave Wouldn’t vote
Scotland gets more than its fair 
share of spending
52 47 62 34
Scottish parliament should pay 
for services from its own taxes 
(strongly agree)*
81 (49) 76 (37) 92 (64) 75 (37)
Scottish MPs should no longer 
be allowed to vote on English 
laws (strongly agree)*
(55) 67 (30) 77 (47) 54 (23)
The UK government can’t be 
trusted to work in English interest
62 55 69 61
Source:	Future	of	England	survey	2012	
Note:	Base	N	for	all	questions	is	3,600	unless	noted	with	*	where	N	is	1,826.
Table 2.4 
Devo-anxiety by attitudes 
to EU membership, 
England, 2012 (% agree)
Table 2.5 
Devo-anxiety by EU 
referendum voting 
intention, England, 2012 
(% agree)
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Government perceived as most influential
All
Local 
authority
uk 
government Eu Other
Scotland gets more than its fair 
share of spending
52 61 48 66 42
Scottish parliament should pay 
for services from its own taxes 
(strongly agree)*
81 (49) 77 (40) 80 (42) 94 (69) 52 (38)
Scottish MPs should no longer 
be allowed to vote on English 
laws (strongly agree)*
81 (55) 80 (51) 80 (49) 93 (74) 80 (42)
The UK government can’t be 
trusted to work in English interest
62 54 55 76 75
Source:	Future	of	England	survey	2012	
Note:	Base	N	for	all	questions	is	3,600	unless	noted	with	*	where	N	is	1,826.
Attitudes towards England’s two unions, therefore, are clearly linked: Euroscepticism and 
devo-anxiety are two sides of the same coin of English discontent. 
Euroscepticism is also clearly associated with a demand for greater recognition for 
England in the UK’s own constitutional arrangements. Eurosceptics are strong advocates 
of a clearer institutional demarcation of their country within the UK. This is demonstrated 
in tables 2.7–2.9, which display the relationship between constitutional preferences 
regarding England and attitudes towards Europe. In each case it is only the least 
Eurosceptic respondents who offer plurality support for the current constitutional position. 
By stark contrast, for more Eurosceptic respondents the status quo is the fourth most 
popular option, trailing behind English votes on English laws, an English parliament and an 
independent England outside the EU.
Attitude to Eu membership
All Good thing Bad thing Neither
England should be governed as it 
is now with laws made by all MPs 
in the UK parliament
22 40 14 18
England should be governed with 
laws made solely by English MPs 
in the UK parliament*
33 29 38 34
England should have its own 
new English parliament with 
law-making powers
18 15 22 17
England should be an 
independent state inside the EU
7 9 3 11
England should be an 
independent state outside the EU
8 0 17 4
Don’t know 12 7 6 15
N 1,774 499 769 386
Source:	Future	of	England	survey	2012	
*	‘English	votes	on	English	laws’
Table 2.6 
Devo-anxiety by 
perception of 
government influence, 
England, 2012 (% agree)
Table 2.7 
Constitutional 
preferences by attitudes 
to EU membership, 
England, 2012 (% agree)
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Voting intention in an Eu referendum
All Remain Leave Wouldn’t vote
England should be governed as it 
is now with laws made by all MPs 
in the UK parliament
22 38 14 11
England should be governed with 
laws made solely by English MPs 
in the UK parliament*
33 30 38 25
England should have its own new 
English parliament with law-
making powers
18 15 23 14
England should be an 
independent state inside the EU
7 11 4 8
England should be an 
independent state outside the EU
8 0 16 6
Don’t know 12 6 6 35
N 1,774 577 900 78
Source:	Future	of	England	survey	2012	
*	‘English	votes	on	English	laws’
Government perceived as most influential
All
Local 
authority
uk 
government
European 
union Other
England should be governed as it 
is now with laws made by all MPs 
in the UK parliament
22 30 29 13 23
England should be governed with 
laws made solely by English MPs 
in the UK parliament*
33 27 33 37 33
England should have its own new 
English parliament with law-
making powers
18 21 17 22 4
England should be an 
independent state inside the EU
7 10 7 5 8
England should be an 
independent state outside the EU
8 6 4 16 10
Don’t know 12 5 10 7 22
N 1,774 56 982 555 44
Source:	Future	of	England	survey	2012	
*	‘English	votes	on	English	laws’
In short, although political commentary – especially around the rise to prominence of Ukip 
– tends to portray Britishness as being in tension with European integration, our findings 
show clearly that it is those with the strongest and most exclusively British sense of 
national identity who are most supportive of the EU. Euroscepticism is concentrated most 
heavily among those with a more English sense of national identity. It is English, rather 
than British, hackles that rise in response to Europe, just as it is those who identify more 
strongly as English who feel most aggrieved by the perceived iniquities of devolution and 
wish to give England some explicit recognition within the UK.
Table 2.8 
Constitutional 
preferences by EU 
referendum voting 
intention, England, 2012 
(% agree)
Table 2.9 
Constitutional 
preferences by 
perception of 
government influence, 
England, 2012 (% agree)
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2.3	Interpreting	this	picture	of	Englishness
How should we interpret these findings? It would be easy to resort to ‘little Englander’ 
stereotypes, to construct a narrative that charges the population of England with a hostility 
to ‘the other’ – ‘Europeans’, Scots, foreigners in general – that borders on xenophobia. 
But to dismiss, patronise or demonise the attitudes traced in this report would be 
counterproductive. It is important to try to understand how English identity has come to 
be politicised and associated with such powerful sentiments of Euroscepticism, devo-
anxiety and demand for some form of English self-government. At least three potential 
explanations – none of them necessarily mutually exclusive – suggest themselves.
The first concerns material interests. One possible explanation for the attitudes identified 
here is simply that many people in England increasingly perceive both of their unions as 
detrimental to their material interests. If this is so then we would expect Euroscepticism 
and devo-anxiety to be related to the extent to which people believes that Scotland 
benefits more than England from the Union, and that the EU benefits more than England 
from UK membership. In short, the politicisation of English identity may largely be about 
(shifting) perceptions of material self-interest: ‘it’s the economy, stupid!’
A second interpretation would focus on traditional understandings of the nature of 
the uk state in England. While Scottish scholars saw the pre-devolution UK as a ‘union 
state’, in which significant vestiges of pre-union distinctiveness could persist, mainstream 
English opinion viewed such differences as inconsequential or archaic (or knew nothing 
of them). Marriage arrangements at Gretna Green were almost the only instance where 
this kind of national difference entered the popular consciousness. The prevailing view 
in England was of Britain/the UK as one and indivisible, with undiluted sovereignty held 
by the Crown-in-Parliament. Similar intellectual contortions proposed that parliamentary 
sovereignty might also survive European integration. Yet the developing realities of 
devolution and European integration have rendered such understandings increasingly 
untenable. The politicisation of English identity may, against this background, be a 
response to the way in which multi-level government within and beyond the UK state 
offends deeply rooted English assumptions about the nature of legitimate authority.
Thirdly, we may be observing a legitimacy crisis among the political institutions that 
govern England. The power and prestige of Westminster and Whitehall has been 
challenged by the collapse of Britain’s status as a global power, by European integration, 
by devolution, and by recent episodes of sleaze and scandal. Moreover, these institutions 
are seemingly unable to address the bulk of its citizenry by their chosen, collective name: 
‘England’. Perhaps a substantial proportion of the English feel both poorly served by 
and disenfranchised from their apparently tarnished and diminished traditional political 
institutions, and in the absence of clear alternatives have withdrawn their ‘diffuse support’ 
for them.
Our intention is to explore these (and other) possible explanations in subsequent reports. 
Nevertheless, and notwithstanding the interest and importance of understanding how and 
why English identity has become politicised, we contend that this politicisation must now 
be considered a centrally important political and social fact in its own right.
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This chapter explores the implications of the emergence of England as a distinct political 
community in the context of an English society that is multicultural. In The dog that finally 
barked we noted a ‘significant ethnicity gap’ in the national identities claimed by white and 
by black and minority ethnic (BME) respondents – BME respondents identified themselves 
as less English and more British than white respondents – but these findings had to be 
regarded as provisional given the small number (fewer than 100) of BME respondents in 
our 2011 survey.
To explore this and other issues in greater depth and with greater statistical power we 
added a booster sample of 500 BME respondents to the 151 BME respondents in the 
core FoEs 2012 sample, for a total BME sample of 651. Of that, the largest group – just 
over half (336) – was of South Asian ethnicity, mainly Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi. 
The only other ethnicity of significant size in the sample was ‘black’ (163). Perhaps 
surprisingly, given the diversity of the BME category, we did not see major variations 
among different BME ethnicities in any of the key questions we examine here. In what 
follows, therefore, we report responses from a single BME group, comparing them directly 
with white English respondents.
3.1	Identity
Given an open choice from a list of identities, BME respondents were slightly more likely 
than white respondents to choose a British identity. However, BME respondents were 
much less likely to claim English identity: this was chosen by only a quarter of them, but 
over three-fifths (62 per cent) of white respondents. 
When forced to choose a single identity, our white respondents marginally favoured 
British over English identity; by contrast, a majority of BME respondents chose a British 
identity, while fewer than a quarter selected English. This contrasts with patterns observed 
in Scotland and Wales, where BME survey respondents have often preferred the ‘local’ 
national identity over the British one.
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	 3.	 Can	englIShneSS	be	InCluSIve?
Figure 3.1 
‘Forced choice’ national 
identity by ethnicity, 
England, 2012 (%)
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We get similar results using the Moreno national identity scale, which allows for gradations 
of English and British identity. Although the ‘equally English and British’ category is the 
plurality choice for white respondents, the remainder of the sample lean heavily towards 
the English end of the scale. The opposite is true for BME respondents: barely more than 
one in 10 choose an exclusively or mainly English identity (12 per cent combined), and 
‘British not English’ is actually the plurality choice (27 per cent).
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Similar findings emerge in response to questions on aspects of national pride. Most 
BME respondents claim to be proud to be both British and English, and proud of the 
Union and St George’s flags. However, they show lower levels of pride generally than 
white respondents, and particularly in relation to the specifically English variations. BME 
respondents are also notably less likely than white respondents to support St George’s 
Day as a public holiday, and they are very substantially less likely to indicate that they 
would favour an English designation on their passport.
Proud to be… Proud of…
Preferred nationality on 
passport
Agree 
with…
British English union Jack St George’s 
flag
British English St George’s 
Day as 
national 
holiday
White 83 80 78 63 50 41 67
BME 77 62 64 40 72 14 47
Source:	Future	of	England	survey	2012	
Note:	Base	N	for	all	questions	is	3,401	for	the	white	category	and	652	for	the	BME	category.	
Questions:	How	proud	are	you	of	being	British/English?	When	you	see	this	flag,	how	do	you	feel?	Union	Jack/St	George’s;	
St	George’s	Day	should	be	a	public	holiday?	If	you	were	allowed	to	choose	the	nationality	that	appears	on	your	passport,	
which	of	these	descriptions	would	you	choose?
This lower level of pride in and support for national symbols generally, and the lower 
level of endorsement for English as opposed to British national symbols, clarifies the 
difference between our white and BME samples. However, this does not mean that BME 
respondents do not have a strong sense of attachment to England as a place: they do, 
and at a level not much different to that of white respondents. But in terms of identity, 
England’s BME population tends to align itself to the broader, and perhaps rather looser, 
notion of Britishness rather than to Englishness more narrowly.
Figure 3.2 
Moreno national 
identities by ethnicity, 
England, 2012 (%)
Table 3.1 
British and English 
national pride by 
ethnicity, England, 
2012 (%)
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Question:	How	closely	attached	do	you	feel	to	these	different	parts	of	the	world?
One possible reason for these differences is that England’s BME population continues to 
associate Englishness with a hostility towards immigration. Table 3.2 shows that those 
who identify as exclusively English are considerable more likely to believe that ‘government 
gives too much help to immigrants’ – 71 per cent of this group agree strongly with the 
statement, compared to 54 per cent and 48 per cent of those who are ‘more English than 
British’ and ‘equally English than British’ respondents, respectively.
English not 
British
More English 
than British
Equally English 
and British
More British 
than English
British not 
English
Agree strongly 71 54 48 35 33
Tend to agree 19 28 29 27 28
Tend to disagree 4 10 13 20 20
Disagree strongly 0 2 3 10 12
Don’t know 6 6 7 9 8
N 545 734 1,405 371 234
Source:	Future	of	England	survey	2012	
Question:	To	what	extent	do	you	agree	or	disagree	with	the	following	statements?	(Please	tick	one	option	per	row)…	
Government	gives	too	much	help	to	immigrants
3.2	Devo-anxiety	and	Euroscepticism
To what extent are these differences also reflected in political attitudes? Chapter 2 
suggested that an English political community has emerged that is discontented with 
various aspects of the status quo: with European integration, with Scottish devolution, 
and with the capacity of the British political system to respond to English concerns. If our 
BME sample is less ‘English’ than our white sample, does it also follow that they are more 
content with their lot? The answer is a qualified yes.
Figure 3.4 shows responses sorted by ethnicity to the block of questions used earlier to 
illustrate ‘devo-anxiety’ in England (see section 2.2). BME respondents are clearly less 
concerned than their white counterparts about the perceived advantages that Scotland 
Figure 3.3 
Attachment to place 
by ethnicity, England, 
2012 (% ‘very’ or ‘fairly’ 
closely attached to…)
Table 3.2 
Attitudes towards 
immigration by Moreno 
national identity, 
England, 2012 (%)
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enjoys as a result of devolution, and the relative disadvantages supposedly facing 
England. They are substantially less likely to agree with the proposition that Scotland 
gets more than its fair share of public spending, and more likely to believe that the UK 
government can be relied upon to act in the English interest. 
Nevertheless, the biggest group among BME respondents endorses both propositions. 
And while the majorities among BME voters agreeing that Scottish MPs should not vote 
on English laws and that the Scottish parliament should finance its spending through its 
own taxes are smaller and less vociferous than with white voters (note the big difference in 
the proportions that ‘agree strongly’), these are nonetheless clear and decisive majorities. 
These figures do not reveal BME endorsement of the status quo, but rather less – though 
still significant – dissatisfaction with that status quo.
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Note:	Base	N	for	all	questions	is	3,401	for	the	white	category	and	652	for	the	BME	category	unless	noted	with	*	where	N	is	
1,685	for	the	white	category	(no	change	for	the	BME	category).
Much of the difference between the two samples in responses to these questions is 
accounted for by the consistently higher proportion of BME respondents choosing the 
‘don’t know’ option (by some 14–16 percentage points for each question). This suggests 
a BME population that is generally less engaged with and concerned about the question 
of England’s place within the UK.8 But to the extent they are concerned, their views are 
similar to those of the white majority, though less strongly felt.
8	 However,	there	are	no	significant	differences	in	levels	of	general	political	interest	between	white	and	BME	
respondents:	two-thirds	of	both	white	and	BME	respondents	claimed	to	be	‘very’	or	‘fairly’	interested	in	politics.
Figure 3.4 
Devo-anxiety by 
ethnicity, England, 2012 
(% agree)
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However, findings differ with regards to England’s other union, the EU (see table 3.3). 
More BME respondents think the UK’s membership of the EU is a ‘good thing’ rather 
than a ‘bad thing’; among white respondents the opposite is true. In the event of any 
referendum, BME respondents show a slim preference for continued EU membership, 
whereas among white respondents there is clear support for withdrawal. Perceptions 
of the relative influence of the EU are also notably different, with white respondents 
more than twice as likely as BME respondents to identify the EU as having the 
greatest influence over the way England is run. (It is also worth pointing out, however, 
in the context of a generally more positive attitude towards the European Union, that 
BME respondents are again more likely than their white counterparts to choose the 
‘don’t know’ option.) 
These findings do not demonstrate enthusiastic BME endorsement of the EU – on 
the contrary, there is substantial discontentment in evidence. But these are the kinds 
of doubts about Europe we find in Scotland or Wales, rather than the especially high 
(white) English levels of suspicion and hostility.
White BME
Attitude to Eu membership
Good thing 28 34
Bad thing 45 27
Neither 20 22
Don’t know 7 17
Voting intention in an Eu referendum
Remain 32 37
Leave 51 34
Wouldn’t vote 4 10
Don’t know 12 19
Government perceived as most influential
Local authorities 3 6
UK government 55 61
European Union 32 14
Other 2 2
Don’t know 7 16
Source:	Future	of	England	survey	2012	
Note:	Base	N	for	all	questions	is	3,401	for	the	white	category	and	652	for	the	BME	category.
The overall pattern we find is of a BME group which is discontented with current 
devolution arrangements and limited in its enthusiasm for the EU, but which is 
significantly less discontented with both than are white respondents.
Given that BME respondents do not express the same level of concern about 
England’s ‘others’ in Scotland and the EU, one might expect them to show less 
concern over the capacity of current governing arrangements to secure English 
interests. This is indeed the case. 
Our survey examined constitutional attitudes in a number of ways. One was to ask 
about the relative importance of different constitutional issues. The UK’s relationship 
with the EU was the most popular choice for BME respondents, as for whites, but 
notably fewer BME respondents chose this as a priority (see figure 3.5). 
Table 3.3 
Attitudes towards the 
EU by ethnicity, England, 
2012 (%)
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Governing arrangements for England were a strong second among white 
respondents, but selected as a priority issue by only half as many BME respondents, 
and were only the fifth most commonly selected issue (also behind strengthening local 
government, proportional representation and House of Lords reform).
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Question:	Which	three,	if	any,	of	the	following	areas	do	you	think	require	urgent	action	or	change	at	this	time?	(Please	select	
up	to	three	options)
White and BME respondents also differed interestingly on potential options for governing 
England (figures 3.6 and 3.7). Responding to the options on offer in the first question, the 
plurality BME response was ‘don’t know’, again suggesting lower levels of knowledge 
of, or interest in, questions of political structure among this group. Only just over a third 
of BME respondents supported either of the two main ‘English options’ (English votes 
on English laws at Westminster or an English parliament), compared to a clear majority 
of white respondents, with BME respondents particularly reluctant to endorse an English 
parliament. BME respondents were also a little more likely to support the status quo. That 
said, even among BME voters there is more support for English votes on English laws 
than for the status quo.
Figure 3.5 
Priorities for ‘urgent 
action or change’, 
England, 2012 (%)
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Question:	With	all	the	changes	going	on	in	the	way	different	parts	of	the	United	Kingdom	are	run,	which	of	the	following	do	
you	think	would	be	best	for	England?
When the constitutional options for England are presented differently, we find a narrow 
plurality of BME respondents favouring the status quo over English votes on English laws. 
By contrast, a clear plurality of white respondents favoured the latter option. And BME 
respondents are again much more likely than whites to choose the ‘don’t know’ option.
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Question:	Thinking	about	how	England	should	be	governed,	which	one	of	the	following	statements	comes	closest	to	your	view?
Figure 3.6 
Preferences for the 
governance of England 
by ethnicity, England, 
2012 (%)
Figure 3.7 
Constitutional 
preferences by ethnicity, 
England, 2012 (%)
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3.3	Englishness	and	Britishness	among	the	UK’s	BME	population
In The dog that finally barked we cautioned that England’s emergence as a political 
community raised potentially far-reaching and challenging questions about inclusion of 
a BME population that appeared not to share the stronger sense of English identity that 
we identified among the population at large. But this cautionary note was sounded in 
the context of a very small number of ethnic minority respondents in our 2011 survey; by 
including an ethnic minority booster in 2012 we have been able to explore this issue in 
much greater depth.
The result has confirmed our findings regarding national identity. BME respondents identify 
as British rather than English to a far greater extent than their white counterparts. In terms 
of constitutional attitudes, however, differences between BME and white respondents 
are more limited. BME respondents are less dissatisfied with current arrangements 
than whites, but the differences lie generally in degrees of discontentment rather than 
between contentment and discontentment. Similarly with attitudes towards the EU: BME 
respondents in England are less discontented than their white compatriots, but they are 
hardly a wellspring of Europhilia.
In other words, England’s BME population broadly shares many of the same concerns 
as the majority white English population, if less vehemently. It could well be that a shared 
sense of discontentment is what binds England’s multicultural society together.
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This paper has both confirmed and extended the arguments made in The dog that 
finally barked. England is emerging as a distinct political community – a community 
characterised by an increasingly politicised sense of English national identity and by 
significant discontent with England’s place within the post-devolution UK. Our 2012 survey 
has demonstrated that this discontentment persists and has shown that it is closely linked 
with hostility towards England’s other union, the EU. Among the English, devo-anxiety and 
Euroscepticism are two sides of the same coin.
In this concluding section, we shall explore the extent to which the emerging English 
political community has a party-political dimension. How is support for the different 
political parties associated with the concerns and priorities that we have identified? 
The substantial sample size of our 2012 survey helps us here: we have large samples 
of Conservative (931) and Labour (1197) supporters.9 The samples of Ukip (312) and 
Liberal Democrat (262) supporters provide a less statistically robust basis for analysis – 
nonetheless, some of the differences we identify in this chapter are so substantial that it is 
unlikely they reflect nothing more than sampling error.
Given the substantial discontentment in England with the territorial status quo, it is 
unsurprising that these sentiments are observable among supporters of all political parties. 
But there are also important differences between supporters of the different parties. In 
general, we find Liberal Democrats at one end of the spectrum and Ukip supporters at 
the other. The former are the most British in terms of national identity and (ironically, given 
their party’s long history of campaigning for constitutional reform) the most content with 
the constitutional status quo both within the UK and vis-à-vis the EU.
Equally ironically, given their party’s Union Jack-bedecked symbolism and British rhetoric, 
Ukip supporters are by far the most English in terms of national identity and are by far the 
most strongly discontented with both of England’s unions, favouring major constitutional 
change both domestically and in the UK’s relationship with the EU. Conservative 
supporters share much common ground with Ukip and count, likewise, as constitutional 
radicals. Labour supporters are on average the most evenly spread in terms of identity 
and constitutional views (or, to put it less charitably, are the most divided).
We can illustrate these differences through responses to the questions examined earlier 
on national identity and attitudes both to the internal constitutional arrangements of the 
UK and towards the EU. 
4.1	Identity
The first point to note is that party support in England is clearly associated with national 
identity (see table 4.1). It is only Liberal Democrat voters in England who are more likely 
to prioritise their British identity (and even among this group it is only very marginally the 
case). By contrast, Labour voters place more emphasis on their Englishness than on their 
Britishness: while a plurality say they are equally English and British, far more of their 
supporters can be found at the more exclusively English end of the scale (31 per cent) 
than at the more exclusively British end (19 per cent). However, the strength of English 
sentiment is most striking among Ukip and Conservative supporters. Fully 55 per cent of 
Ukip supporters, alongside 43 per cent of Conservatives, favoured the two ‘more English’ 
options. While the majority of supporters of all parties choose some form of overlapping 
Anglo-British identity, for Tories and Ukip supporters the English end of the spectrum is 
clearly favoured.
9	 For	of	this	report,	respondents	are	defined	as	‘supporters’	based	on	their	general	election	voting	intention.
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All
Liberal 
Democrat Labour Conservative ukip
English not British 15 7 13 17 27
More English than British 20 18 18 26 28
Equally English and British 39 40 40 40 32
More British than English 10 16 13 8 6
British not English 7 10 6 6 3
Other 6 7 7 3 4
Don’t know 3 3 3 1 1
N 3,600 262 1,197 931 312
Source:	Future	of	England	survey	2012
Questions on national pride and national symbols reveal a similar picture (see table 4.2). 
Clear majorities of respondents from all four parties were proud of being both British and 
English. The Union flag prompts more enthusiasm among supporters of all parties than St 
George’s flag (the difference among Liberal Democrat supporters in their perceptions of 
the two flags is particularly pronounced), while Labour and Liberal Democrat supporters 
were notably less fired by flags in general. There was a significant difference between party 
supporters in their attitudes towards making St George’s Day a national holiday, with Ukip 
supporters the most enthusiastic and Liberal Democrats the least, although there was 
majority support for such a move among all respondents. 
Intriguingly, a substantial majority of Ukip supporters would choose English rather than 
British as their passport nationality. This is in stark contrast to the position among Labour 
and Liberal Democrat supporters (although even here, around a third would choose 
English as their passport nationality.) Conservative supporters were much more evenly 
divided with a narrow plurality favouring the British designation. Once again, the overall 
picture is that while supporters of all parties consider themselves both British and English, 
Englishness weighs more heavily among Conservatives and, in particular, Ukip supporters.
Proud to be… Proud of…
Preferred nationality on 
passport
Agree 
with…
British English union Jack St George’s 
flag
British English St George’s 
Day as 
national 
holiday
Ukip 75 85 82 75 35 59 81
Conservative 89 92 90 74 49 47 77
Labour 83 80 72 57 55 35 73
Lib-Dem 88 78 82 55 55 32 65
All 82 81 78 62 51 40 73
Source:	Future	of	England	survey	2012	
Note:	Base	N	for	all	questions	is	3600
4.2	Devo-anxiety	and	Euroscepticism
Turning to our measures of devo-anxiety, we again find some striking differences between 
party supporters (see table 4.3). Discontent is widely shared, but is felt particularly strongly 
among Conservative and, especially, Ukip supporters. The strength of feeling here is very 
striking: 67 per cent of Conservative supporters and 84 per cent of Ukip supporters agree 
strongly with the proposition that Scottish MPs should be denied a vote on laws that 
affect England only. Only in relation to levels of trust in government working in the English 
interest does the prevailing pattern of discontent vary: here, Conservatives (but less so 
Table 4.1 
Moreno national identity 
by party support, 
England, 2012 (%)
Table 4.2 
British and English 
national pride by party 
support, England, 
2012 (%)
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Liberal Democrats) are notably more trusting in the UK government, suggesting that this 
question is, at least for supporters of the senior partner in the Coalition government, 
acting as a proxy for partisan support.
All Lib-Dem Labour Con. ukip
Scotland gets more than its fair share of 
spending
52 42 53 66 74
Scottish parliament should pay for services 
from its own taxes (strongly agree)*
81 (49) 80 (38) 79 (42) 89 (63) 93 (72)
Scottish MPs should no longer be allowed 
to vote on English laws (strongly agree)*
81 (55) 86 (47) 78 (48) 89 (68) 91 (78)
The UK government can’t be trusted to 
work in English interest
62 47 75 38 87
Source:	Future	of	England	survey	2012	
Note:	Base	N	for	all	questions	is	3,600	unless	noted	with	*	where	N	is	1,826.
While attitudes towards the UK’s internal territorial constitution reflect varying levels 
of discontentment, those towards the EU reveal sharper contrasts between party 
supporters (see table 4.4). Liberal Democrats tend to view EU membership positively, 
while Labour supporters are evenly split. By contrast, Conservatives are overwhelmingly 
Eurosceptic, regarding UK membership as a ‘bad thing’ by a margin of five-to-two. They 
are even more likely to vote for UK withdrawal in a referendum. 
However, and as might be expected, Tory attitudes look moderate when compared to 
those of Ukip supporters. Indeed, the proportion of Ukip voters who would vote ‘no’ to 
EU membership in a referendum – 91 per cent – is close to unanimity. Equally striking is 
the finding that fully 69 per cent of Ukip voters believe that the EU has the greatest influ-
ence over the way that England is run; among Liberal Democrats, by contrast, the equiva-
lent figure is only 18 per cent. In sum, partisan perceptions of and views about ‘Europe’ 
differ starkly.
All
Liberal 
Democrat Labour Conservative ukip
Attitude to Eu membership
Good thing 28 52 38 21 4
Bad thing 43 20 34 53 86
Neither 21 23 20 22 9
Don’t know 8 5 8 3 1
Voting intention in an Eu referendum
Remain 33 60 44 25 5
Leave 50 29 40 62 91
Wouldn’t vote / Don’t know 17 11 16 13 4
Government perceived as most influential
Local authorities 3 3 3 4 1
UK government 55 71 63 56 23
European Union 31 18 26 34 69
Other 2 4 2 1 3
Don’t know 8 4 6 4 4
Source:	Future	of	England	survey	2012	
Note:	Base	N	for	all	questions	is	3,600.
Table 4.3 
Devo-anxiety by party 
support, England, 2012 
(% agree)
Table 4.4 
Attitudes towards the 
EU by party support, 
England, 2012 (%)
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4.3	Perspectives	on	England	within	the	UK
Concerning options for the future governance of England, tables 4.5 and 4.6 report 
responses to our two constitutional preference questions according to voter intention. 
Strikingly, the status quo gains plurality support only once: in the case of Labour voters’ 
responses to the second menu of constitutional options. Indeed, it is only among Labour 
supporters that the status quo fares relatively well at all (although even here support for 
the various English options collectively far outweighs support for current arrangements). 
By contrast, Conservative and Ukip voters are the least enthusiastic about the status 
quo, the latter in particular. With the one aforementioned Labour exception, ‘English 
votes on English laws’ is the plurality option across party supporters whatever the menu 
of options offered – and again by some margin among prospective Conservative and 
Ukip supporters. Among Conservatives, support for an English parliament – the more 
ambitious option – rivals that for the status quo, while among Ukip supporters an English 
parliament is very much more popular than the status quo. Such is the disdain among 
Ukip supporters for the current order that even support for English independence (outside 
the EU, of course) is more popular than the status quo. But in terms of how the Coalition 
government might respond positively to calls to address the English question, the clear 
plurality support among Liberal Democrat supporters for ‘English votes on English laws’ 
is probably at least as significant.
All
Liberal 
Democrat Labour Conserv. ukip
Status quo 21 27 27 19 14
‘English votes for English laws’ 36 38 28 46 42
English parliament 20 19 18 21 32
Regional assemblies 8 9 10 5 6
Don’t know 16 7 16 10 6
N 1,774 139 597 455 146
Source:	Future	of	England	survey	2012
All
Liberal 
Democrat Labour Conserv. ukip
Status quo 22 27 29 21 9
‘English votes for English Laws’ 33 37 27 42 45
English parliament 18 13 15 19 28
England independent inside the EU 7 6 8 6 2
England independent outside the EU 8 8 9 6 16
Don’t know 12 9 12 6 0
N 1,774 139 597 455 146
Source:	Future	of	England	survey	2012
However, if support for delineating England more clearly within the structure of the UK 
is common ground among party supporters, there are also important differences. One 
is the priority accorded to the issue (see table 4.7). For all except Liberal Democrats, 
who still hanker after electoral reform, the UK’s relationship with the EU was the most 
pressing constitutional issue – emphatically so for Conservatives and Ukip. Beyond 
that, however, on the right of the political spectrum we find that how England is 
governed was a strong second choice. This contrasts notably with Labour and Liberal 
Democrat supporters, for whom England was one of a cluster of issues of roughly equal 
importance, alongside House of Lords reform and strengthening local government.
Table 4.5 
Preferences for 
governance of England 
by party support, 
England, 2012 (%)
Table 4.6 
Constitutional 
preferences by party 
support, England, 
2012 (%)
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All
Liberal 
Democrat Labour Conserv. ukip
The UK’s relationship with the EU 59 50 51 73 84
How England is governed now that 
Scotland has a parliament and Wales has 
an assembly
42 37 34 55 58
A more proportional system for electing 
MPs at Westminster
29 60 30 20 30
Strengthening local government 27 30 36 22 16
Reforming the House of Lords 26 35 35 20 21
Scotland’s future relationship with the UK 25 15 23 33 29
The future of Northern Ireland 5 6 5 6 2
None of these 4 3 5 3 1
Don’t know 11 7 10 7 4
Source:	Future	of	England	survey	2012	
Question:	Which	three,	if	any,	of	the	following	areas	do	you	think	require	urgent	action	or	change	at	this	time?	(Please	select	
up	to	three	options)
Our findings show that Ukip support reflects English discontentment with the political 
status quo – and not simply with ‘Europe’. The breadth of this discontent, as outlined 
here, has recently enabled Ukip to overtake the Liberal Democrats in poll ratings and to 
secure a ‘projected national share’ of 24.8 per cent of the vote in the May 2013 local 
elections – elections that also gave the party a meaningful local government presence for 
the first time in much of England.10
Yet in the only local elections held outside England in May 2013 – in Ynys Môn, in north-
west Wales – Ukip actually saw its vote decline significantly. Similarly, in European parliament 
and UK general elections since 1999 (when Ukip first emerged as a reasonably significant 
player) Ukip’s performance in Wales and (especially) Scotland has consistently lagged well 
behind that in England; in the June 2013 Aberdeen Donside Scottish parliament by-election 
Ukip lost its deposit despite a highly publicised campaign spearheaded by Nigel Farage. It 
is those who feel most English and most discontented with the territorial status quo who 
are flocking to the Ukip banner in increasing numbers. Ukip might better be described as 
England’s nationalist party than the UK’s independence party.
Further confirmation of this point is found in table 4.8, which reports responses at three 
different points in time to the question ‘Which party best stands up for the interests of 
England?’
June 2011 Nov 2012 April 2013
ukip 9 18 21
Labour 21 19 19
Conservatives 20 16 17
No party 23 22 16
Liberal Democrats 4 3 6
BNP 4 3 2
Greens 2 2 2
English Democrats 2 2 1
Don’t know 15 15 15
Source:	YouGov	poll	for	IPPR/FoEs,	April	2013
10	 For	more,	see	Curtice	J	(2013)	‘Never	to	be	forgotten?	The	2013	English	local	elections’,	Juncture,	20(1):	
62–70.	http://www.ippr.org/juncture/171/10970/never-to-be-forgotten-the-2013-english-local-elections	
Table 4.7 
Priorities for ‘urgent 
action or change’ by 
party support, England, 
2012 (%)
Table 4.8 
‘Which political party 
best stands up for the 
interests of England?’ (%)
IPPR  |  England and its two unions: The anatomy of a nation and its discontents37
Two points stand out. The first is how poorly the established parties perform: not 
once does their combined total represent more than 45 per cent of respondents. 
Indeed, in both June 2011 and November 2012, the proposition that ‘I do not think 
that any party stands up for the interests of England’ was the most popular choice.
By April 2013 that had changed, bringing us to the second point: the rise of Ukip 
as the champion of English interests. Viewed in the light of this finding, the party’s 
strong performance in the local elections just a few weeks later is unsurprising. 
‘England’s nationalist party’ is on a roll. Since June 2011, it has more than doubled 
its support as the party that best stands up for English interests, and in April 2013 
was the top choice among respondents in England. Ukip’s rise in this context will be 
of particular concern to the Conservatives. Those who reported in FoEs 2012 having 
voted Conservative at the 2010 UK election are split on which party who they believe 
best stands up for England: while 38 per cent say the Conservatives, almost as 
many (34 per cent) say Ukip – and this figure has almost doubled from 18 per cent in 
2011, hinting at the potential for Conservative electoral support to drift over to Ukip.
Ukip – a party traditionally associated with espousing a 1950s-style British tradition-
alism – has been reluctant to play the English card, for fear it might muddy their 
position on Europe and weaken the union. But with its support so heavily concentrated 
in England and finding itself attractive to voters who are increasingly interested in a 
decidedly English strain of populism, it seems likely that it will seek to champion the 
cause of English nationalism more explicitly. Should it do so, it could further strengthen 
its appeal in England with potentially far-reaching political implications.
4.4	The	political	implications	of	Englishness
We argued in The dog that finally barked that politics in Westminster’s ‘bubble’ had 
paid insufficient attention to the strengthening of Englishness. That argument appears 
stronger still in 2013. Apart from isolated interventions – such as Ed Miliband’s 2012 
speech on England11 (which sits rather uneasily with the ‘One Nation’ imagery he has 
otherwise evoked) – there are few signs that mainstream politics has woken up to the 
emergence of an English political community defined by a distinct English identity, its 
devo-anxiety and Euroscepticism, and its support for English political institutions.
There are various reasons for this. Much of the political class remain in denial, failing 
to acknowledge the trends identified in this report, or refusing to admit their salience. 
Others prioritise Scotland, fearing that engagement with the ‘English question’ 
may in some way strengthen the hand of Alex Salmond ahead of the Scottish 
independence referendum. It would seem a little odd, though, if advocates of union 
refused to talk about its largest constituent part at a point when in Scotland the very 
terms of union are being challenged. Where is the English perspective – which is not 
the same as the Westminster perspective – on what the UK union is and should be?
Another factor is a sense of trepidation about what contemporary Englishness stands 
for. For some, Englishness seems to be regarded as a dark and chauvinistic force, 
best kept under wraps. The evident association of English discontentment with the 
right-wing populism of Ukip may well reinforce that concern. In particular, progressives 
may be reluctant to engage with the emerging English agenda for fear of legitimising 
what they see as the grievances of ‘little Englanders’. 
11	 Miliband	E	(2012)	‘Defending	the	Union	in	England’,	speech,	Royal	Festival	Hall,	London,	7	June	2012.		
http://www.labour.org.uk/ed-miliband-speech-defending-the-union-in-england	
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This, we believe, would be a serious error. The issue is not going to go away. This is not 
merely because of the public attitudes identified in this report – although they constitute 
sufficient cause in their own right – but also because the continuing processes of 
renegotiation of the terms of union in Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales will ensure 
that England, by default, becomes ever more clearly delineated as a distinct political 
arena. Any decision to ignore English discontentment for fear of guilt by association 
with right-wing populism is only likely to further feed such discontentment – and 
perhaps encourage it to develop more toxic undertones, if the perception grows that 
the political class is simply ignoring issues of real concern to people.
The challenge is for the major parties to take England seriously, and this appears easier 
for the Conservatives than Labour. Conservative supporters in England identify more 
strongly as English than Labour supporters, and are more anxious about devolution, more 
Eurosceptical, and stronger advocates of English political institutions. There is an obvious 
strategy of tacking more overtly towards these positions, not least to ward off the inroads 
Ukip is making in this section of the electorate. The Tories’ Byzantine manoeuvres on the 
question of an EU referendum around the 2013 Queen’s speech are an obvious, if clumsy, 
example of this strategy in action.
There is a bigger challenge for Labour. Some may review the data here and conclude that 
Englishness is natural territory for the right and should not be a ground on which Labour 
competes – especially if a ‘more English’ Labour might undermine the party’s standing in 
Scotland and Wales. Yet the importance of Labour’s strength outside England is easily over-
stated. Labour has never won a stable and enduring parliamentary majority without winning 
a majority of seats in England – Labour needs to win in England to win UK elections. 
So there is no alternative but for Labour to contest the changing England described in 
this report. It needs to find a distinct, progressive platform from which to secure and 
develop its strength in England – or risk leaving ‘Englishness’ to become ever-more-
closely associated with the political right. It needs to recognise that its supporters also 
– if currently less emphatically than Conservative and Ukip supporters – have a strong 
sense of English identity, embrace English national symbols, and share concerns about 
devolution and Europe.
Labour has the patriotic traditions on which to build this platform. From the Levellers 
to Orwell and Tawney, there are serious intellectual roots to the English radicalism on 
which significant strands of the Labour tradition draw. There is no reason to believe that 
recognising England as a political community and giving it a voice must be inevitably 
linked to the more inward-looking and defensive agendas pursued on the political right.
And there are now serious options for institutionalising England’s political community 
within the UK political system. The recently published report of the McKay Commission 
is particularly helpful here.12 This is not only – or even mainly – because of the specific 
proposals put forward by the Commission (principally a limited, non-binding form of 
‘English votes on English laws’). Even more significant, perhaps, is the way the report 
seeks to reframe the so-called ‘West Lothian question’. For McKay, the point is not simply 
to assuage English resentment about Scotland’s perceived advantages, but rather to 
encourage the political class to speak positively both to and about England.
12	 McKay	Commission	(2013)	Report of the Commission on the Consequences of Devolution for the House 
of Commons,	London.	http://tmc.independent.gov.uk/report-of-the-commission-on-the-consequences-of-
devolution-for-the-house-of-commons/
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Doing so, of course, represents a serious challenge for the political parties that contest 
elections in England and for a political system that has thus far failed to provide a 
distinctive platform for England’s concerns and growing discontents. But the English 
discontentment with the status quo that is revealed in this report is so substantial that 
political leaders cannot afford to avoid the issue any longer.
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The survey was conducted between 23–28 November 2012. Survey fieldwork 
was conducted by YouGov, whose assistance throughout the project we gratefully 
acknowledge. The main sample had 3,600 respondents. Of these, 151 were classified 
as BME respondents. Our BME booster sample, as described in chapter 3 above, 
enabled us to have a BME sample of 651 respondents. All data used in the analysis 
was weighted for representativeness of the registered adult electorate, using YouGov’s 
standard weighting factors which adjust for a range of demographic and attitudinal 
factors, including age, gender, region, social class, newspaper readership and past vote.
Much of the content of the 2012 Future of England survey questionnaire parallels the 
2011 Future of England survey. The main innovation has been a battery of questions 
exploring the European dimension. To accommodate these, a number of Wales- and 
Northern Ireland-focused questions included in 2011 were dropped; however, questions 
about attitudes to, and comparisons with, Scotland were retained. We took this decision 
in part because Scotland is a central focus of media and public attention as we approach 
the independence referendum in September 2014. But the 2011 survey also suggested 
that English voters’ concerns about devolution were directed primarily at Scotland.
While these factors justify a fuller focus on Scotland, we note that there has also been 
significant media commentary about Wales’ preferential treatment compared to England 
on issues like free prescriptions or higher education, and that there was some evidence 
of concern about the perceived favourable treatment of Wales in our 2011 survey. Simply 
because our 2012 survey focuses overwhelmingly on Scotland, it should not be assumed 
that resentment is directed only at Scotland. As is shown in our analysis, people in 
England tend to think in English terms and to perceive England (not England, Wales and 
Northern Ireland, or England and Wales) as the aggrieved party.
We have also used the flexibility and cost-effectiveness of internet-based surveys to 
experiment with some new question wordings. Those seeking to understand changing 
constitutional attitudes in England not only have to deal with a relative paucity of survey 
evidence but also a problematic tendency to stick rigidly to past question wordings, 
even when these include options no longer relevant to the contemporary debate or fail to 
include currently live options. Our approach has been both to use past questions (even 
where they are now problematic) to facilitate tracing change over time and to introduce 
newer – and in some places we hope better – question wordings.
As with the 2011 Future of England survey, the 2012 survey was largely funded by the 
Universities of Cardiff and Edinburgh, to whom we are grateful
As in The dog that finally barked, in this report we sometimes present FoEs findings 
alongside those from other sources, notably the British Social Attitudes survey (BSA), 
even when modes of data collection differ. This may offend purists still waging what, 
in our view, are outdated ‘mode wars’. But we believe this is particularly appropriate 
when discussing a topic where the evidence is scant and all relevant sources should be 
mobilised. We trust to readers’ good sense to observe where methodological caution is 
necessary.
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